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In this paper a model is proposed for analysing alternative policies that might be 
used in allocating water in Thailand.  The model used is an integration of farm 
linear programming models with a spatial equilibrium model, using the so-called 
price-linked  farm  and  spatial  model  (Batterham  and  MacAulay,  1994).    A 
method  of  linking  spatial  equilibrium  models  and  linear  programming 
representations of farm models via the demand side as opposed to the supply side 
is outlined in this paper.  A case study is made of the Chao Phraya Delta, an area 
that is progressively challenged by competing claims for water use and which 
needs to better allocate water resources. 
 
Key words: water use, spatial equilibrium model, Thailand 
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Water scarcity is recognized as an issue of the highest priority in natural resources 
management  in  Thailand.    As  water  is  scarce  and  a  valuable  resource,  there  are 
different interests in a society on how water should be used and allocated, giving rise 
to  a  water  allocation  problem.    Water  allocation  in  Thailand  is  by  the  so-called 
‘administered  system’  under  the  government’s  management.    In  the  past,  the 
development  of  new  water  supplies  was  the  main  approach  adopted  by  the 
government agencies concerned to provide water to meet demands from all water uses 
and users.  However, under the present conditions it is well recognized that rapidly 
growing demand for water cannot be easily met through such new investments in 
water supplies.  The increasing difficulty  and high financial costs involved in the 
development  of  new  water  supplies  in  the  country  have  forced  changes  in  water 
management  practices  from  expanding  water  supplies  to  considering  other 
alternatives in water management; such as a demand management approach. 
 
Thailand’s  water  economy  is  entering  a  more  ‘mature’  phase;  this  justification  is 
based on an analytical framework derived from the work of Randall (1981).  Randall 
classified  the  water  economy  into  two  phases,  namely  expansionary  and  mature 
phases.  The expansionary phase is identified by a price elastic supply of ‘new’ water 
and a low but growing demand for delivered water.  The mature phase is identified by 
an inelastic supply of ‘new’ water and the need for expensive rehabilitation of aging 
projects.  Using this classification, an implication is that: different phases of the water 
economy  require  different  applications  of  water  policies.    As  such,  Thai  water 
resources management needs to be reconsidered so as to reflect the change in the 
country’s water economy.  In 1997, institutional reforms for regulation of the use of 
water  resources  in  Thailand  were  initiated  as  a  result  of  the  change  in  the  water 
economy and the increasing scarcity of water resources.  The process of institutional 
reforms for water is continuous and directed, particularly with respect to new water 
legislation  and  new  water  management  approaches,  towards  improved  equity  and 
greater efficiency.   4 
 
In Thailand, the idea of achieving economic efficiency in water allocation was first 
proposed in the Seventh National Economic and Social Development Plan (1992-96), 
in the form of enhancing the profitability of water by the application of water pricing 
principles  and  other  market-based  solutions.    It  has  been  accepted  at  the  national 
policy  level  that  the  allocation  of  water  needs  innovative  mechanisms  to  manage 
water more efficiently.  However, it is not yet clear how market-based solutions can 
be applied to water in Thailand under the existing Thai culture in which water users, 




In  this  situation,  there  is  little  or  no  economic  analysis  to  support  the  debate  on 
different water policies in the context of Thailand’s water economy.  In particular, 
determining the consequences and impacts of different water policies at a macro level 
have  not  yet  been  studied.    An  open  research  question  is  whether  efficient  water 
allocation  matters.    To  date,  this  challenging  question  has  not  been  thoroughly 
examined. 
 
In attempting to understand the consequences and impacts of different water policies 
in  Thailand’s  water  economy,  an  economic  model  for  water  allocation  from  an 
optimal-allocation  perspective  is  developed  and  used  to  assess  the  potential  gains 
from different water policies.  This paper is structured into four parts.  The first part of 
the paper provides an introduction to the existing water allocation system in Thailand.  
In the second part the methodology for modelling water use is described.  Some initial 
model results are presented from the model development process in the third part of 
the  paper.    The  paper  ends  with  some  concluding  comments,  implications  and 
discussion. 
 
The existing water allocation system in Thailand 
The existing water allocation system in Thailand is examined by using the framework 
proposed  by  Challen  (2000).    The  framework  is  used  for  describing  institutional 
                                                 
1 In Thailand, there is no water charge for agriculture and low (i.e. heavily subsidized by taxpayers) 
water charges for piped-water from the water supply utilities. 
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structures where there is an identified institutional hierarchy for the resource situation 
being studied.  A description is then given of the institutions at each level of the 
hierarchy  in  terms  of  three  broad  parameters:  the  property-right  regimes;  the 
entitlement  systems  for  initial  allocation;  and  the  means  for  reallocation.  
Additionally,  details  of  how  water  is  allocated  will  also  be  provided.    The  terms 
‘property rights’ and ‘entitlement systems’ are used throughout the description of the 
institutional hierarchy.  Their definitions are provided as follows: 
 
Property rights are those of authorised powers used in the management of a property 
resource.  Property-rights, as primarily defined by Alchian (1965, 1987) and Cheung 
(1969) are the ability to enjoy a piece of property (as quoted in Barzel, 1997, p. 3). 
 
In the case of an entitlement system, it is referred to as a mechanism for physically 
dividing  the  resource  between  potential  water  users.    Challen  (2000)  defines  an 
entitlement system as a quota system, in which two generic types of quota exist: a 
resource quota and an input quota.  A resource quota establishes a direct limit on the 
amount of the resource that the owner of the quota may use or consume.  An input 
quota places a limit on other inputs utilised within the production process in which the 
resource  use  is  being  studied.    An  initial  allocation  of  entitlements  to  a  resource 
between  competing  parties  can  occur  in  two  generic  ways:  allocation  by 
administrative  decisions  by  resource  managers;  or  allocation  by  a  market  process 
whereby the resource managers sell units of entitlement to competing users.   
 
The institutional hierarchy 
There are four levels of the institutional hierarchy for the regulation of surface water 
use in the Chao Phraya river basin.  In each level of the institutional hierarchy, the 
property-rights regime, the entitlement system and the mechanism for allocation are 
described below and illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
The first level: national resource 
At the first level of the institutional hierarchy, the property-right regime is that of the 
concept  of  public  domain  (Wongbandit  and  Worapansopak,  2000).    However,  the 
government has a sole authority to determine use and access to water by the provision   6 
of water related laws.  For example, the Civil and Commercial Code as in Section 
1304 indicates waterways (natural flows or rivers) as one kind of public property. 
 
Entitlements  to  the  use  of  water  along  the  river  flows  are  subject  to  land-based 
principles (riparian rights), and public interest under legislative regulations, such as 
reasonable use and duties.  These principles and regulations all fall into the category 
of resource quotas.  Likewise, if water flows in the rivers are diverted to be stored in 
reservoirs,  entitlements  are  also  resource  quotas  because  water  is  divided  among 
potential uses by a proportional share of the available water in reservoirs, thus there 
exists  a  direct  limit  on  the  amount  of  water  that  the  potential  users  may  use  or 
consume under a quota system.  The initial allocation of water at this level is decided 
by an administrative decision. 
 
The second level: basin resource 
At the second level, it is considered that if water flows are captured into storage sites, 
the holder of the water property-rights is considered to be the state, but the property 
regime is considered to be a common property.  This is because water in storage sites 
is administered by government agencies under the legal regime, and such water is 
allocated to various water users.  The water in storage facilities (e.g. dams, reservoirs 
etc),  are  managed  by  major  government  agencies  (e.g.  the  Royal  Irrigation 
Department, Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand) who have the authority to 
command  and  control  the  use  of  surface  water  in  storage  facilities.    Thus,  water 
allocation is undertaken by an administrative process, and the entitlement system is 
that of a resource quota.  The resource quota appears in the form of a bulk allocation 
of storage water, which is conducted yearly in all basins across the country to various 
water users.  The allocation mechanism is that of administrative allocation. 
 
The third level: sector resource 
At the third level, water is considered as a group (sector) resource, and its property 
regime is that of common property as water is shared among various water users, for 
example irrigated agriculture, residential use and industry (based on piped-water), and 
the environment (salt protection, and in-land navigation). 
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At the third level, where various water users are grouped, and receive a direct amount 
of water, there are different entitlements.  In a government irrigation scheme, such as 
the greater Chao Phraya irrigation scheme, an irrigation right is set as a quota on the 
volume of water that an irrigation farmer may use in a given time period, that is, for 
example, in the dry season.  The allocation mechanism in the irrigation scheme is 
administered by the Royal Irrigation Department.  Other main groups of water users at 
this level are those of non-agriculture (residential, and industry).  These water users 
are derived water users of piped water produced by the Waterworks Authorities.  The 
Royal Irrigation Department collects an “irrigation fee” for the supply of irrigation 
water to the Waterworks Authorities for their production of piped-water but the water 
charges are insignificant amounts.  However, the distribution of piped water by the 
Waterworks  authorities  is  under  administered  prices  (fee-based),  which  are  varied 
from location to location and by end uses.  Piped-water users are entitled to water use 
by their payments and their collective use is subject to a resource quota decided by an 
administrative process at basin level.  
 
The fourth level: individual resource 
At the fourth level, water is  managed as  an individual resource, and the property 
regime is private property.  For example, farmers in an irrigation scheme can decide 
what  crops  they  want  to  grow;  individual  piped-water  users  (both  residential  and 
industry uses) can decide their patterns of use based on their own objectives (that is, 
focusing on their utility or profit etc).  Entitlements for use at this level are those of a 
resource quota under private decision. 




Holders of Property Rights, 






















Figure 1: Institutional Hierarchy for Regulation of Controlled Surface Water Use 
in the Chao Phraya River Basin 
Source: Adapted after Challen (2000, p. 64). 
 
Besides, the four levels of institutional hierarchy presented above, it is also useful to 
look at the decision-making process corresponding to the property-rights regime at 
each  hierarchical  level.    Again,  this  can  be  illustrated  by  adopting  Challen’s 
framework of the property-right hierarchy
2 (Challen, 2000) as in Table 1.  In this 
illustration, the decision-making process in each of the four hierarchical levels are 
restated, and summarized (see Table 1). 
                                                 
2 The original framework was intentionally designed to eliminate difficulties in the broad classification 































Administrative allocation  Administered prices  Resource quota 
Administrative allocation   9 
Table  1:  Conceptual  Property-Right  Hierarchy  in  Regulated  Surface  Water  in  the 
Chao Phraya River Basin 
Scope of Allocation 
Problem 








water at the national 
level 
Various government 
agencies at the national 
level gathered in a 
committee 
Public property 
controlled by the 
government 
Water available from 
storage facilities for a 
particular river basin 
Allocation of 
available water in a 
particular river basin 
(i.e. the Chao Phraya 
River Basin) 
Water manager, Royal 
Irrigation Department 
(RID) 
Common property  Quantity allocated to 






within a particular 
water sector 
Individual or group of 
government agencies 
responsible for the 
provision for water in 
different uses (i.e. 
agriculture by RID; 
piped water for 
residence and industry 
by Waterworks 
Authorities) 
Common property  Collective quota in a 
particular irrigation 
scheme; or collective 
quota for plants to 
produce piped water 




collective quotas to 
individual farmers, 
or sale to non-
agricultural users 
Individual farmers; or 
piped-water users 
Private property  Private production, 
private utility and 
investment decisions 
Source: Adopted from Challen (2000, p. 25). 
 
How water is allocated 
How  water  is  practically  allocated  in  Thailand  is  illustrated  by  examining  the 
allocation  of  surface  water  in  storage  facilities  with  particular  reference  to  the 
allocation in the dry season. 
 
Water allocation at national and basin levels 
Water allocation plans in the dry season are made by a committee
3 in the form of a 
bulk  allocation  of  water  to  different  uses  as  a  guideline  to  allocate  water  at  the 
subordinate levels. The bulk allocation of water is based on the estimated amount of 
                                                 
3 The committee for promoting and planning for dry-cropping is responsible for the dry-season water 
allocation plan, of the which the Royal Irrigation Department acts as the committee’s secretariat. 
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regulated surface water available in reservoirs as of 1 January in a planning year.  The 
water availability in reservoirs is classified into four cases as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Classification of Water Conditions based on Active Storage Levels in the 
Bhumipol and Sirikit Reservoirs 
Case  Active Storage of Bhumipol and Sirikit Reservoirs 
  Classification by the 
amount of water (mil. 
cubic metres) 
Year occurred  Real active storage 
(mil. cubic metres) 
Wet year  >12,000  January 1997  12,101 
Normal year  6,000-12,000  January 1998  8,200 
Dry year  4,000-6,000  January 1993  5,357 
Driest year  <4,000  January 1994  2,048 
Source: Panya Consultants Co, et al. (2000). 
 
The decision criteria for the use-based bulk allocations are set up using a priority 
guideline (Srivardhana, 1994).  Top priority is given to domestic consumption that 
accounts for about 7-8 per cent of the total demand, followed by irrigation that is the 
major demand and accounts for 90 per cent of total demand.  Besides these two uses, 
water  is  allocated  for  inland  navigation,  saline  water  intrusion  and  hydropower 
generation.  In the context of water law, these water rights-holders are the so-called 
“use-based water rights”. 
 
The used-based bulk allocation is illustrated in Table 3.  There are five different users 
holding claims for such an allocation.  First, the allocation for consumption in the area 
below the two reservoirs in the upper area of Nakornsawan province accounts for 500, 
800, 1,300, and 1,700 million cubic metres in a dry year, a normal year and a wet year 
respectively.    Second,  the  water  amount  allocated  for  the  greater  Chao  Phraya 
irrigation scheme for dry-season rice cultivation is varied from 3,300 to 5,050 million 
cubic  metres  depending  on  water  conditions.    Third,  the  allocation  for  navigation 
accounts for 0 to 400 million cubic metres.  Navigation gets the least priority among 
the ranks of the use-based water rights, and gets zero water in the driest year.  Lastly, 
the allocation by Metropolitan Water Works Authority (MWA) to the piped-water 
utility for Bangkok and its vicinity has the most senior right among other uses and 
receives  about  650  to  750  million  cubic  metres  for  users.    The  allocation  for   11 
protection of salt-water intrusion is to protect farmlands and fruit tree areas close to 
the river mouth of the Chao Phraya River.  It is also an important use and has had 
from 500 to 600 million cubic metres in a normal year, and 350 to 450 million cubic 
metres in a dry year.  Besides the decision on bulk allocations, a decision is made on 
the amount of water diverted from nearby reservoirs for use and the estimation of the 
planted rice area in the dry season. 
 
Table 3: Water Allocation Plan for the Bhumipol and Sirikit Reservoirs January-June 
of 1995-2001 
Activities  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Effective water as of 1 January  12,733  14,582  12,107  8,200  3,879  11,930  13,500 
1. Allocation for consumption 
in  the  upper  area  of 
Nakornsawan Province: 
800  1,700  1,300  1,300  500  1,300  1,300 
- Phitsanulok Irrigation Project  300  800  500  500  200  500  500 
- Other activities  500  900  800  800  300  800  800 
2. Greater CP Irrigation Project  3,600  5,050  4,550  3,700  2,100  3,300  4,300 
3. Navigation  300  400  300  300  0  300  300 
4. Metropolitan Water Works  700  750  750  750  650  750  750 
5.  Protection  of  Saline 
Intrusion 
600  600  500  450  350  350  350 
Total (1-5)  - Planned  6,000  8,500  7,400  6,500  3,600  6,000  7,000 
  - Actual  7,216  9,643  8,556  6,656  2,575  6,513  - 
6. Pasak reservoir  - Planned  -  -  -  -  -  500  500 
  - Actual  -  -  -  -  -  762  - 
7. Second rice planted area in 
greater CP scheme (million rai) 
             
  - Planned  2.8  3.5  3.3  2.7  1.90  3.10  3.35 
  - Actual  3.19  4.15  4.06  3.79  3.49  4.90  - 
Note:  1. Water unit: Million Cubic Metres 
2. The Pasak reservoir has supplied water to the lower Chao Phraya delta since 
2000, with an annual amount of 500 million cubic metres. 
 
Source: Royal Irrigation Department (2000). 
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Water allocation at the subordinate level 
Once the water allocation plan is made, there are operations at the subordinate levels 
to  allocate  water.    The  allocation  process  is  illustrated  in  Figure  2.    The  Royal 
Irrigation Department (RID) through the office of hydrology and water management 
plays a crucial role in implementing water allocations to achieve the set plan.  The 
office is responsible for setting up a plan for water distribution in the main canals, and 
coordinating the water released from reservoirs.  At the subordinate level, under the 
administration of RID, the irrigation regional office is responsible for the project level 
































Figure 2: Water Allocation Mechanisms for Storage Reservoirs in Chao Phraya Basin 
Source: Pal Consultants Ltd., (1999). 
Water users strictly 
follow the water 
allocation plan 
denotes a direct authority 
 
denotes an indirect 
authority 
EGAT: The Electricity 
Generating Authority of 
Thailand 
RID:    The Royal Irrigation 
Department 
National Water Resource 
Committee 
(NWRC) 
Relevant government agencies 
cooperate for developing a water 
allocation plan 
Major plan for bulk 
water allocation in 
Bhumipol, Sirikit 
reservoirs 
EGAT, RID by Office of 
hydrology and water 
management manage water 
allocations according to the plan 
Consider proportion 
of water for various 
users as required 
Water users can 
normally use water  
Irrigation Regional 
Office 
- Advise irrigation 
projects about water 
allocation and project 
maintenance. 




Office of hydrology & 
water management 
- Data collecting and 
monitoring 
- Estimate water required 
- Set up water allocation 
plan 
- Set up 
water 
distribution 
plan for main 
canals 
- Allocate 









Water distribution and 
maintenance at irrigation 
project level 
- Recommend and set up 
water allocation at 
irrigation project level 
- Allocate water 
sufficiently within the 
project 
- Collect data eg rainfall, 
crop production area etc 














Normal year  Critical year   14 
Modelling water use 
Brief background of study area, the Chao Phraya delta 
The greater Chao Phraya irrigation scheme 
The greater Chao Phraya irrigation scheme has a total of 25 sub-irrigation projects 
with approximately 1,206,832 hectares, receiving water supply from the Bhumipol 
and Sirikit reservoirs (Figure 3).  This irrigation scheme is stratified into four regions 
based on the normal stratification set by the Royal Irrigation Department.  They are 
set  according  to  the  irrigation  water  supply  block,  location  of  the  area  and  the 
irrigation systems in place.  In the model part of this study, a number of aggregate 
irrigation demand regions are delineated according to this stratification.  The four 
irrigation regions are spatially connected with an irrigation canal network. 
 
 
Figure 3: The Chao Phraya Delta, the Greater Chao Phraya 
 Irrigation Scheme Location  
Source: Molle(2001).   15 
The four regional areas include: upper west, lower west, upper east, and lower east.  
In the upper area of the Chao Phraya irrigation scheme, most irrigation projects are 
under a gravity irrigation system, having 20 gravity irrigation sub-projects with a total 
area of 867,200 hectares.  In the lower part of the scheme, there are six conservation 
irrigation projects with a total area of 350,400 hectares.  Irrigation area and crops 
grown in the four irrigation regions are provided in Table 4. 
 









  (hectare)  Major rice  Dry rice  Field crops Sugar cane Vegetables Fruit trees 
Upper west  374,916.8  310,427.2 149,766.4 2,166.4 28,142.4 662.4 6,488.0
Upper east  304,083.2  268,532.8 32,672.0 5,915.2 2,238.4 483.2 6,892.8
Lower east  321,040.0  152,441.6 83,523.2 72.0 0.0 28.8 25,571.2
Lower west  206,792.0  134,424.0 122,744.0 328.0 270.4 4,772.8 18,132.8
Total  1,206,832.0  865,825.6 388,705.6 8,481.6 30,651.2 5,947.2 57,084.8
Source: The Royal Irrigation Department (2000). 
 
Farming System in the Greater Chao Phraya Irrigation Scheme 
Farming systems in the Greater Chao Phraya irrigation scheme in the four stratified 
regions have similar cropping patterns (see Table 4).  Double rice farming (that is, 
growing  rice  twice  within  a  crop  year  in  the  same  area)  is  normally  practiced 
throughout  the  irrigation  area.    Other  crops,  such  as  soybeans,  groundnuts,  mung 
beans, and maize are also listed as field crops grown in the area as wet and dry season 
crops.  There is a small area of sugar cane, a perennial crop grown in the irrigation 
area.  Sugar cane is mostly grown in the upper west and east of the irrigation scheme 
with 7.5 per cent in the upper west region, and 4.9 per cent in the upper east region.  
Moreover, fruit trees such as oranges, durian, and grapes are grown in the lower east 
and lower west of the irrigation scheme. 
 
A theoretical framework 
A  modified  spatial  equilibrium  modelling  approach  will  be  used.    The  model 
development is based on how the water allocation is currently being practiced in the   16 
study area, however, the criteria for such allocation among competing water users will 
be based on an optimisation framework which is different from the current allocation 
basis. 
 
Spatial Equilibrium model 
How the price mechanism works to settle an equilibrium in separated markets is the 
basic idea of the spatial equilibrium model.  Bressler and King (1970) demonstrated a 
model for two-regions and a single commodity in spatially separated markets in which 
the  equilibrium  price  can  be  solved  graphically  from  the  combined  demands  and 
supplies of the two regions.  However, the equilibrium price for a number of spatially 
separated markets has been extensively solved, and based on the concept of excess 
supply and excess demand of the trading regions (Takayama and Judge, 1971; Martin, 
1981;  MacAulay,  1992).    How  an  equilibrium  between  excess  supply  and  excess 
demand forms a new equilibrium price is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Equilibrium prices before trade takes place are indicated as  ) ( ) ( 2 2 1 1 x p and x p . The 
opening of trade between the two regions occurs when there is a sufficient difference 
in the equilibrium prices between the two regions to at least cover the transfer costs.  
The  bidding  away  of  this  difference  is  referred  to  as  price  arbitrage.    With  the 
assumption of a positive transfer cost denoted as t12, it follows that arbitrage will 
continue until the prices in the two regions differ by the amount of the transfer cost.  
This results in a trade flow between the two regions and the new equilibrium prices 
are indicated  as p1, and p2 with the quantity flow from  region one to  region two 
indicated as x12 (illustrated in Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Representation of the Spatial Equilibrium Model with Transfer costs 
Source: MacAulay (1992). 
 
A description of a general quantity formulation of the spatial equilibrium model is 
provided as follows (MacAulay, 1992):  
 
For a set of n regions, quantity dependent linear supply and demand functions may be 
defined as: 
 
Demand function:  Y P Y W - =c   (1) 
Supply function:  X PX H + =u   (2) 
 
where   and   are n x 1 column vectors of the intercepts of the demand and supply 
functions respectively;   and   are n x n matrices of slope coefficients  i and  i for 




























































































































The standard spatial equilibrium model is a quadratic programming problem.  One 
form of this problem consists of a quadratic objective function, which is a measure 
of net social monetary gain (Takayama and Judge 1971, p. 256).  Other objective   18 
functions have been formulated based on consumer and producer surplus welfare 
measures.  The net social monetary gain objective function consists of the social 
monetary  gain,  pyy,  less  the  total  social  production  cost,  pxx,  less  the  total 
transport  cost,  T´X.    The  net  revenue  objective  function  can  be  illustrated  as 
follows: 
 
Net revenue = py y  - px x – T’X 
 
For a general set of nonlinear demand and supply and transfer cost functions the 
model may be written as follows: 
 

































































































































































































































  (6) 
and  , 0 ) ( ¢ ³ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ x y p p X x y    
 
where f(y) is a well-behaved Marshallian (indirect) market demand function vector 
(n x 1), g(x) a well-behaved Marshallian market supply function vector (n x 1), 
and T(X) is a suitable transport cost function vector (n
2 x 1) and  
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are non-negative demand and supply price vectors each (n x 1) 
 
By inspection it is clear that (5) is the net social revenue, that is total revenue 
f(y) y minus total production costs g(x) x minus total transport cost T(X) X.  The 
combined  set  of  constraints  (6)  are  a  set  of  perfectly  competitive  spatial 
equilibrium market conditions. 
 
Let the Lagrangian function for the problem of equations (5) and (6) be f1, so that 
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By inspection it is clear that the primal solution P is equivalent to the dual solution 
























































Price-linked spatial equilibrium model 
The proposed model is constructed with a demand-side set of linear programming 
models  and  a  spatial  equilibrium  model.    This  is  a  modified  application  of  the 
standard spatial equilibrium models developed by Takayama and Judge (1971).  The 
price-linked  farm  and  spatial  equilibrium  have  farm  linear  programming  models 
embedded in the spatial equilibrium model and replace the estimated farm or regional 
supply functions of the standard spatial equilibrium model (Batterham and MacAulay, 
1994).  Thus, under this approach it is not necessary to explicitly estimate supply 
functions.  This approach is adapted in this paper, with the links made via the demand 
side to reflect the farm demand for water.  That is, linear programming models, linked 
with  a  spatial  equilibrium  model  of  the  water  network,  will  be  constructed  to 
implicitly estimate demands for water at the farm level rather than an estimate of farm 
supply functions as was done in the work of Batterham and MacAulay (1994). 
 
How the model works and model specifications 
Descriptions of the model 
The model focus is on water allocation in the Chao Phraya delta represented by the 
greater  Chao  Phraya  irrigation  scheme—the  major  beneficiary  of  Bhumipol  and 
Sirikit reservoirs.  Water allocation in this irrigation scheme is modelled in order to 
assess an optimal water allocation between sectoral water uses in a spatial context and 
to evaluate alternative irrigation water allocation policies that might be used for water 
allocation in Thailand.  The model is a short run model with a one-year horizon. 
 
A number of aggregated demand sites for water users are connected to six spatial 
units in the Chao Phraya delta.  A schematic representation of the irrigation supplies, 
regional demands, and water transfers of the Chao Phraya delta network is illustrated   21 
in Figure 5.  First, there is an aggregate water supply, four aggregate agricultural 
regions, one aggregate urban region (that is, residential, and industry uses), and water 
transfers in the Chao Phraya delta network.  The spatial units of water supply and 
demand in the delta network can be modelled in the form of a network structure—an 
abstracted  representation  of  the  spatial  relationship  between  water  supplies  and 
sectoral water demands.  The network structure is incorporated into the price-linked 
farm  demand  spatial  equilibrium  model  as  shipment  (that  is,  commodity  transfer) 
variables.  In this study, the network structure will be modelled with transhipment like 
activities designed to allow water to be drained from one area and re-used in another.  






















Figure5: A Schematic Representation of Irrigation Supplies, Regional Demands, and 
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An example of the price-linked farm water demands and spatial equilibrium model 
In  this  section  an  example  of  the  price-linked  farm  water  demand  and  spatial 
equilibrium model is described.  This model is an illustrative model designed to assist 
in the model building process and to help in policy analysis.  The model is in two 
parts: the first is a non-linear spatial model of water allocation in the system and the 
second is a part of a representation of water users (farmers, residences, industries and 
environment) demanding water.  In the combined model, primal-dual farm models 
link to the spatial equilibrium model with links made by connecting the water input 
modelled at the farm level to price and quantity variables in the spatial equilibrium 
model.  This approach has the farm linear programming models set within the spatial 
equilibrium  model  and  replacing  the  estimated  farm  or  regional  water  demand 
functions of the more standard spatial equilibrium model (Flinn and Guise.1970 and 
Guise  and  Flinn  1973)    The  method  of  incorporating  farm  models  into  spatial 
equilibrium models provides a means of generating an endogenous estimate of water 
demand at the farm level.  Thus, under this approach it is not necessary to explicitly 
generate water demand functions. 
 
Network structure  
The  network  flow  structure  in  the  standard  spatial  equilibrium  model  is  normally 
represented by the matrices Gy and Gx, and these form part of the quantity condition 
that demand and supply must balance.  These two matrices are placed in the spatial 
equilibrium model in the form of linear constraints.  In the example model, a matrix 
representing  the  network  structure  modelled  for  the  in-out  shipments  of  water 
demands and supplies in the system, is a network flow of irrigation water which is 
designed to correspond to the system’s irrigation channels.  In its simplest form water 
flows to each area of use from the dam, essentially by gravity.  The network structure 
is directed and made in the form of a node-arc matrix representation (Ahuja, 1993).  
This representation stores the network as an n ´ m matrix, which contains one row for 
each node of the network and one column for each arc.  The column corresponding to 
arc (i, j) has only two nonzero elements: It has a +1 in the row corresponding to a 
supply node i and a –1 in the row corresponding to demand node j. 
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Within this model, the network structure without transhipment is retained.  However, 
the network structure with transhipment will be finally incorporated into the model in 
a later stage of the work.  Transhipment in terms of arc variables will be located as 
columns in the network matrix in which the water flow is allowed in appropriate rows 
of  the  matrix;  that  is  nonzero  elements  having  opposite  signs  to  those  of  non-
transhipment arc variables.  Simply, transhipment arc variables are delineated in order 
to allow the reallocation of water that is initially demanded from a particular region, 
and then make such water available as a water supply for other regions in the network.  
This type of network structure is such that each node in the network is not limited to 
be either an origin or destination, but can be both.  In this way it will be possible to 
have water transferred to one area and then at least partially re-used in another area 
further down the system. 
 
Spatial equilibrium components 
The formulation of the problem as a quadratic programming model follows the price 
form of the spatial equilibrium model as outlined by Takayama and Judge (1971).  
Links to the farm linear programming models into a spatial equilibrium model are 
made through the water quantity demand (a column vector).  The quadratic objective 
function is maximisation of net revenues from the farms and the overall system. The 
objective  function  coefficients  for  the  water  demand  columns  are  zero  since  the 
demand is a transfer vector from the farm level into the regional demand row of the 
spatial  equilibrium  model.    Thus,  there  is  a  simultaneous  determination  of  the 
equilibrium price and quantities in the farm and spatial models.  In the case of urban 
water demand, the slope coefficient for the urban water demand function is included 
in the quadratic part of the objective function. 
 
Linear programming components 
(1) Representative farms 
Representative farms in four regions are modelled.  Each sub matrix represents a 
farming system for the region and this has considerable detail on farming activities 
and available resources.  In the simple model, double rice and field crops farming are 
modelled in each of the regions.   Water is an input demanded by the  production 
process of  growing crops in each of the four  regions.   It would seem rational to 
assume  that  the  water  quantity  demanded  by  crops  and  the  prices  of  water  are   24 
dependent on the profitability of the growing crop.  Therefore, the objective function 
of the overall farm model is the maximization of the total gross margin for the whole 
region.  The maximisation of the gross margin for each region is constrained by the 
resources available. 
 
(2) Representative urban water uses 
Representative urban water users are those water users in residences and in various 
industries.  The urban water users are represented by a simple demand function in 
which the quantity of water demanded in the urban sector is dependent on the average 
water prices (administered prices set by the water authority).  The water demand 
functions are derived from a set of price and quantity points and an elasticity estimate.  
These functions are outlined below along with the methods of calculation. 
 
A direct form of the demand function,  bp a y + = is used in the model where ‘a’ and 
‘b’  are  an  intercept  and  a  slope  respectively.    In  this  case,  y  denotes  quantity 
demanded, and p denotes price.  
Assumed  that  the  elasticity  (e),  price,  and  quantity  demanded  are  known.    The 
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y p, are the given price and quantity at the point of evaluation, and the elasticity (e) is 
adopted from a prior study (Sethaputra, et. al., 1990).  
The regional urban water demand is assumed to be the same in each so that the direct 
demand function, at the point of evaluation with a price  elasticity of demand assumed 
to be –0.2 at a given price at 7.5 Baht/cubic metre, and a given quantity at 750 million 
cubic metres, is as follows:  
s s p y 20 900- =  
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Primal-Dual Farm Models and Links to the Spatial Equilibrium Model 
The model is characterized as a self-dual model, in which both price and quantity 
variables  are  included.    The  connection  of  the  farm  models  with  the  spatial 
equilibrium model is made through both a primal form and a dual form by both the 
quantity of water and the water shadow value to the spatial equilibrium model. The 
prices of the resources used in the farm are connected in the dual so that the sum of 
the marginal value product equals the gross margin for the particular product.  Thus, 
there is a simultaneous determination of equilibrium prices and quantities of water 
and the values of the other resources used in the farm and spatial equilibrium models.   
 
Water supply schedules 
Water  supply  in  the  model  is  based  on  water  in  the  Bhumibol  and  the  Sirikit 
reservoirs that is made available for the Chao Phraya irrigation scheme in the Choa 
Phraya delta.  The water supply is a fixed supply quantity set by using the average 
amount of average water availability in different water conditions (wet, normal, and 
dry conditions).  By using a fixed supply, there is no allowance for the stochastic 
nature of water flows.  However, in a short run model covering one year it is sensible 




Transfer costs of water from the headwork reservoir to the regions demanding water, 
and the transfer costs between regions are guestimates in order to make the model 
work.  The transfer costs from a previous study are so high that they prohibit water 
transfer from the headwork reservoir to the regions in the network.  This is an area 
requiring further research. 
 
Results from the model 
Base case scenario  
Selected results for the base-case scenario, which is a market-based allocation with no 
water charges for agricultural use and low charges for urban use is provided in Table 
5. The solution variables, equilibrium prices and water used by farms and the urban 
sector are central features of the model and are discussed below. 
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Equilibrium prices in four agricultural regions and an urban region 
Equilibrium prices in the four agricultural regions and an urban region in the study 
model are given in Table 5.   In this case when there is unused water the price at the 
reservoir is zero and the prices simply reflect the costs of water transfer from the 
reservoir.  As the available water is restricted the reservoir price rises. 
  
Table 5: Equilibrium Prices with No Water Charges for Farms 
Regions  Equilibrium prices (Baht/cubic meter) 
  Demand prices  Supply prices 
Reservoir water supply source  0  0 
Region 1, agriculture use   5  n/a 
Region 2, agriculture use  6  n/a 
Region 3, agriculture use  10  n/a 
Region 4, agriculture use  10  n/a 
Region 5, urban use  10  n/a 
Note: 1 Australian dollar approximately equals 20 Baht. 
 
 
Different policy scenario 
There are a number of alternative water policies that might be used in allocating water 
in  Thailand.  For  example,  fee-based  pricing,  sectoral  quotas,  and  these  are 
investigated with the aid of the model for their policy effects such as patterns of water 
allocation, equilibrium prices, and crop activities. 
 
Fee-based pricing 
If a charge is made for farm use and the water authority were to collect money from 
water users, this will have an impact on the amounts of water used in farms and by 
urban users.  Conceptually, farmers will be charged for their water use according to 
the amount of use multiplied by some charge in each region.  In the model, water 
charges reduce the value of the gross margins of the crops.   
 
However, there is not much change in the allocation of water as it takes a significant 
change in the charges to change the relative ranking of the gross margins at the farm   27 
level.  With  small  linear  programming  models  and  a  limited  range  of  alternative 
activities the changes are also ‘sticky’.  
 
Table 6: Equilibrium Prices with Water Charges for Farms 
Regions  Equilibrium prices (Baht/cubic meter) 
  Demand prices  Supply prices 
Reservoir water supply source  4.36  2.36 
Region 1, agriculture use   9.36  n/a 
Region 2, agriculture use  10.36  n/a  
Region 3, agriculture use  14.36  n/a 
Region 4, agriculture use  14.36  n/a 
Region 5, urban use  14.36  n/a  
 
 
Different water conditions 
As  the  supply  of  available  water  is  reduced  the  regions  that  can  adjust  cropping 
patterns will do so provided the price impact of the reduced supply of water impacts 
the profitability of the crops involved (see Table 7).  The more water intensive crops 
give way to the less intensive crops (that is, from rice to soybean in region 1).  In the 
model results it was possible to stem water price rises until the full transfer from rice 
production in one region had moved to soybeans at which time the water price again 
rose.  This implies that if water is truly a scarce resource one way to get effective 
reduction in use is to allow adjustments to take place through the price mechanism.   
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Table 7: The Impacts of Reduced Supply of Water 
Price/Activities    Available water for use 
  Units  4,300 mill m
3  4,200 mill m
3  3,700mill m
3  3,000mill m
3 
Region 1           
Demand price  Baht/ m
3  14.36  15.08  15.08  17.96 
Rice  1,000 rai  1,963.50  1,826.60  1027.10  0 
Soy  1,000 rai  0.00  136.38  396.40  1,963.50 
Maize  1,000 rai  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Region 2           
Demand price  Baht/m
3  15.36  16.08  16.08  18.96 
Rice  1,000 rai  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Soy  1,000 rai  1,708.50  1,708.50  1,708.50  1,708.50 
Maize  1,000 rai  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Region 3           
Demand price  Baht/m
3  19.36  20.08  20.08  22.96 
Rice  1,000 rai  957.00  957.00  957.00  957.00 
Region 4           
Demand price  Baht/m
3  19.36  20.08  20.08  22.96 
Rice  1,000 rai  841.5  841.5  841.50  841.50 
Region 5           
Demand price  Baht/m
3  19.36  20.08  20.08  22.96 
Urban use  Mill m
3  512.70  498.32  498.3  440.60 
 
With simple allocations of a quota to bring about the same effective restriction on the 
water available to the region there was the same adjustment away from rice.  The 
implication is that a quota regime which does not specify on which crops water may 
be used may have similar effects to a full pricing scheme.  In the case of the quota no 
charges were incurred at the farm level in the model. 
 
A  further  effect  of  reduced  volume  of  available  water  and  an  effective  pricing 
mechanism is a reduction in the water used in the urban area.  This use continues to 
decline as the price rises up the specified demand function. 
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Concluding comments, implications and discussion 
 
As a result of the use of the model, it is apparent that the spatial equilibrium model is 
a useful tool to analyse the impact of different water policies.  In this paper, different 
availabilities of water at the dam source have  been  examined  and  as  a result the 
equilibrium prices as a result  are changed accordingly.  The effect of the different 
prices on the agriculture was then examined.  As might be expected, water intensive 
rice production is subject to pressure and the profitability of other less water intensive 
crops enhanced.  The effective charging for water in Thailand could have substantial 





Further work on the model will involve the implementation of full-scale farm models 
representing the irrigation regions with a sufficient number of alternative enterprises.  
These models will then be incorporated in a network system which will allow for 
water reuse and flows for other purposes such as the environment, electricity and 
navigation.  Allowance will also be made for the two major seasons in Thailand and 
the transfer of water from one season to the next. 
 
One of the issues also to be examined is the effect of quota allocations to the various 
water uses and an assessment made of the shadow values on these quota restrictions at 
the various levels as indicated in the early part of the paper.  Global level restrictions 
of the flow from the dam and restrictions at the irrigation area or farm level are to be 
examined.  With the introduction of quotas it will also be possible to allow the quota 
rights to be traded between the regions and the consequence of this examined.   30 
References 
 
Ahuja,  R.  K.,  Magnanti,  T.  L.,  and  Orlin,  J.  B.  (1993),  Network  Flows:  Theory, 
Algorithms, and Applications, Prentice Hall, N.J. 
 
Batterham,  R.  L.  and  MacAulay,  T.  G.  (1994),  ‘Price-linked  farm  and  spatial 
equilibrium  models’,  Australian  Journal  of  Agricultural  Economics,  38(2), 
143-170. 
 
Barzel,  Y.  (1997),  Economic  Analysis  of  Property  Rights,  Cambridge  University 
Press, Cambridge. 
 
Bressler Jr. Raymond G. and King, R.A. (1970), Markets, Prices, and Interregional 
Trade, John Wiley & Son, Inc., New York. 
 
Challen, R. (2000), Institutions, Transaction Costs and Environmental Policy, Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham United Kingdom. 
 
Flinn, J.C. and Guise, J.W.B. (1970), ‘An application of spatial equilibrium analysis 
to water resource allocation’, Water Resources Research 6(2), 398-409. 
 
Guise J.W.B. and Flinn, J.C. (1973), ‘Allocation and pricing of water resources’, Ch 
27 in Judge, G.G. and Takayama, T. eds, Studies in Economic Planning over 
Space and Time, North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
 
MacAulay, T.G. (1992), ‘Alternative spatial equilibrium formulations: a synthesis’ in 
W. Griffiths, H. Lütkepohl and M.E. Bock (ed.), Readings in Econometric 
Theory and Practice, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.  
 
Martin,  L.  J.  (1981),  ‘Quadratic  single  and  multi-commodity  models  of  spatial 
equilibrium:  a  simplified  exposition’,  Canadian  Journal  of  Agricultural 
Economics 29(1), 21-48. 
   31 
Molle,  F.  Chompadit,  C.,  et  al.,  (2001).  Dry-Season  Water  Allocation  and 
Management  in  the  Chao  Phraya  Delta,    DORAS  Center,  Kasetsart 
University, Bangkok. 
 
Pal Consultants CO., Ltd. and Panya Consultants CO., Ltd. (1999), Study on Water 
Management in the Chao Phraya Basin (Main Report), Bangkok.  
 
Panya Consultants CO., Ltd., Gersar-Societe Du Canal De Provence and Bureau De 
Recherches  Gologiques  Et  Minieres  (2000),  Thailand  Natural  Resources 
Management  Project  Irrigation  Management  Modernization  Component, 
Bangkok.  
 
Randall, A. (1981), ‘Property entitlements and pricing policies for a maturing water 
economy’. The Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, (25), 195-220. 
 
Royal Irrigation Department (2000), Water Allocation Plan and Dry Season Cropping 
Plan in Irrigation Area, 2000-2001, Bangkok.  
 
Setaputra,  S.,  Panyotou,  T.,  and  Wanwacharakul,  V.  (1990),  Water  shortages: 
managing demand to expand supply, paper presented to the 1990 Thailand 
Development and Research  Institute Year-End Conference, Chon Buri, 8-9 
December. 
 
Takayama, T. and Judge, G.G. (1971), Spatial and Temporal Price and Allocation 
Models, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam.  
 
Srivardhana,  R.  (1994).  ‘Water  use  conflicts  in  Bangkok  metropolitan  region 
Thailand’, in J. E. Nickum and K. W. Easter (ed.), Metropolitan Water Use 
Conflicts in Asia and the Pacific, Westview Press, Boulder. 
 
Wongbandit, A. and Worapansopak, J. (2000), 'Water Resources Allocation Policies', 
in United Nations (ed.) Principles and Practices of Water among Water-User 
Sectors, Bangkok, 316-331. 